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THE CENTRAL AMERICAN AND
SPANISH CARIBBEAN SYSTEMS OF JUSTICE:
A NEW FOCUS FOR U.S. DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
Development stragtegies have seldom addressed the justice
systems, and discussions of their problems are notably absent
from national and regional reports.

The Kissinger Commission on

Central America, however, found the situation of the judiciary
sufficiently critical to development strategy that
recommendations for assistance were included within their
proposals.
The Commissionls report noted that "in the absence of strong
legal institutions, political, security and economic crises are
magnified," citing El Salvador, where the "virtual collapse of
the national criminal justice system" has occurred. While no
other country now approaches the crisis level there, the systems
of most of the other Central American and Caribbean republics
present such significant administrative problems and low levels
of public confidence that the preconditions for institutional
crisis and collapse are present.
The Commission specifically recommended that the United
States help strengthen Central American judicial systems to:

"- Enhance the training and resources of judges, judicial
staff, and public prosecutors' off ices.
Support modern and professional means of criminal
investigation.
- Promote availability of legal materials, assistance to
law faculties, and support for local bar associations." (Report
at p. 74)

-

Judicial systems throughout the region operate under

physical, financial and personnel conditions which range from
severely inadequate to virtually neglected.

It is difficult to

truly represent the crisis which these systems currently face.
The most fundamental problem is lack of fixed judicial tenure in
office and very low salaries for judges, prosecutors, and other
court officials.

The endemic unavailability of basic legal

materials to judges, prosecutors, and defenders in the region
affects all aspects of the administration of justice.

Extensive

legislative and case reporting systems, as we know them, are nonexistent in these countries.

Typically, courts, judges, and

prosecutors have no law libraries, and often operate from
outdated versions of basic legal codes.

Trial judges have

virtually no access to the collected jurisprudence or recent
decisions of higher courts for guidance, usually because such
essential research tools do not exist or are hopelessly outdated.
The result is that untrained and untenured judges often decide
cases on the basis of incorrect legal principles, after delays
counted in years.

These poor conditions are the norm in national

capitals and are magnified in the provinces.

In turn, the

confidence in the court system among lawyers and ordinary
citizens is lessened.

If the United States wishes to strengthen

democracy here, urgent attention must be devoted to the
fortification of this basic underpinning of any permanent
democratic system.
Description
---

sf

Judicial Sratem and Its Problems

Qusnizati~n
~f Ganrta
The constitutions of Central American countries all provide
for an independent judicial branch with a pyramidal

organizational structure. Normally there is a supreme court, an
intermediate court of appeals, a trial court of first recourse
for serious cases, and an inferior court of limited jurisdiction,
akin to justices of the peace, for resolution of minor disputes.
These constitutions have been especial ly in£luenced by that of
the United States and contain exemplary guarantees for the
autonomy of the courts and the safety of individual rights.
However, in most of the countries, the presence of a strong
executive has made true judicial independence a rarity.

In all

countries of the region, the judicial branch is constitutionally
independent, but except for Costa Rica, the judiciary lacks such
autonomy in practice.

It is usually the worst organized, poorest

equipped, and most underfunded branch of government.
The & fact0 judicial branch subservience to the executive
has been especially pronounced in the Dominican Republic, where
the courtshaveno control overtheir ownbudget or its
administration.

The Dominican judiciary is charged by law with

administration of its own budget yet, in practice, the
Procurator General, an arm of the executive, acts as the
management agency with the sole discretion to authorize
expenditure of appropriated funds, hiring of judicial employees,
payment of salaries, purchasing, maintenance of courts, etc.
This administrative dependency upon the executive branch
effectively blocks the development of an independent judiciary.
In addition to traditional legal roles, supreme courts also
play a critical management role since they are the supreme
administrative body for the judiciary, exercising almost total

disciplinary power over all lower tribunals and their members.
Depending on the administrative scheme, they may also
supervise a number of diverse functions, some of which would not
be considered "judicial" in nature in the United States:

1)

supervision of the judicial police (presently extant in Costa
Rica only); 2) administration of judicial lay staffs, which in
some cases may be quite numerous; 3) management of budgets for
the entire national judiciary; 4) selection of lower court
judges, often without any voice from the other branches of
government; 5) promulgation of procedural rules for the
administration of courts; and, 6) management of statistical
collection of the court system.
While some supreme courts attempt to exert their
disciplinary powers over lower court judges, they seldom possess
the resources or skill to correctly supervise judicial
discipline.

This supervisory role should not be limited solely

to disciplinary matter, but should also extend to evaluation of
the factors which contribute to defects, such as delay, and
provide solutions to these problems.
Though most members of the judiciary are legal
professionals, in terms of their university degree, most judges
from the supreme court to the lowest levels are totally
unprepared to carry out the administrative functions assigned to
them.

As in the United States, these duties are delegated

primarily to subordinates who are often lawyers themselves, and
suffer the same lack of administrative training and interest.

~1

The U.S.

judiciary, both federal and state, has recognized this

problem and instituted reforms designed to develop a professional

administrative cadre.

However, in Central America, counterparts

to court administrators or clerks of the court are virtually
unknown.

Thus, in most cases, judges do not exercise their

administrative responsibilities efficiently.

This is due to a

lack of human and financial resources, administrative experience,
and/or the perception that administrative matters are not part of
the judicial function.
This administrative disorganization is reflected at all
procedural stages.

In virtually every court, including some of

the supreme courts, the filing systems range from unorganized to
chaotic.

There may be no filing folders, cabinets, typewriters,

photocopiers or file retrieval systems.
simply piled on the floor.

In some cases, files are

A constant source of case processing

delay is the loss or disappearance of files.
While one may conclude that administrative duties are
secondary to legal roles, and thus caseloads prevent the adequate
development of supervisory duties, the legal output of many
supreme courts is not extensive.

In El Salvador, for example,

the supreme court only reviews forty to fifty cassation appeals
per year.

This low figure may be accounted for in part by the

explanation that few cases ever reach the supreme court due to
the high number of prisoners awaiting trial, delays in the
process, and the huge criminal and civil backlogs.
Judicial Selection
In all of the countries, all of the courts above the lowest
levels require legal professionals to act as judges.

However, in

many countries, the lowest level judge frequently is neither a

lawyer nor even a university graduate and, in many instances, may
lack even a completed secondary education.

Especially in rural

areas, this is the judge (juez de paz or de municipio) who
handles most disputes and complaints.

Yet he is the least

educated, lowest paid and most neglected in the system, despite
power to punish minor crimes, hear minor civil cases, and settle
disputes by mediation.

He also has the sole discretion to jail

or release criminal suspects, and investigate major crimes for
forwarding to the next level trial court.
Judges are selected in several ways in the Central American
countries:

1) selection by the executive with the approval of the

legislative branch; 2) selection by the legislative branch; 3)
selection of supreme court by legislature with supreme court, in
turn, naming lower court judges.

In Honduras, the lower court

judges name the justices of the peace.

While in most of the

countries, judges are prevented from other employment, this is
not the case i n E l Salvador where theymay act as notaries even
while exercising judicial authority.
In every Central American country except Costa Rica, the
absence of civil service security contributes to judicial
instability and political interference for a1 1 judicial
personnel.

The most extreme cases of such interference are

Honduras and the Dominican Republic since judicial terms end with
those of the legislative and executive branches, resulting in
massive personnel changes upon the election of an opposition
party.

Without tenure in office, a given judgeship may be held

by a succession of appointees within the same presidential term.

Traininq gf Justice Personnel
Training of judges is verylimitedinthe region. The only
formal judicial school is operated by the Costa Rican judiciary,
but serves mainly as a training mechanism for administrative
support personnel, providing legal education for judges in few
instances.

All of the other countries have expressed a desire to

form judicial schools which would provide training for judges,
prosecutors and public defenders as well as administrative
personnel.

Financial and other constraints have delayed

implementation of such training programs.

Honduras, for example,

possesses the enacting legislation, but the supreme court has not
promulgated the administrative regulations for establishment of
such a training vehicle.
Training of other judicial support personnel has fallen to
the judicial branch, since in most of the countries civil service
protection for judicial employees has never been established.
Panama had a career judiciary, but its system was abandoned in
1969 when President Torrijos abolished the courts.

This lack of

a judicial career has meant a lack of minimum hiring criteria,
lack of job security, lack of a system for promotions or
guaranteeing wage levels, and has compelled the judiciary to
devote what little training resources it possesses to the
training of inferior personnel.
While law faculties might provide practical preparation for
a judicial career, regional legal education is tradition-bound,
and short on practical training of any sort.

Universities have

also been seriously affected by the economic crisis.

While some

law faculties are interested in establishing special course

concentrations for judicial training, nothing has developed thus
far.

Virtually all law schools continue to rely on part-time

faculty and the deanship is often viewed as reserved for those
who canafford to take a l e a v e o f absence fromtheir private
practices.

Library facilities have been curtailed and many of

the law libraries are seriously deficient in maintaining even
minimal collections.

Lnck ofl Data
A problem common to all the countries is lack of reliable
data onwhich t o p l an o r evaluate the system. Costa Rica has
developed a fairly sophisticated statistical system in recent
years, but it is stillmaintainedbyhand and does not provide
immediate information.

The other countries are much farther

behind, and it is impossible to plan for any reforms without
including this important subsector.
Another area which is commonly deficient is the maintenance
of criminal history data.

This is sometimes kept and

administered by the courts, but in most countries it is
maintained by the police.

This information is critical in

making sentencing decisions and a further point of procedural
blockage in those cases in which an inefficient system produces
delays, errors and the potential for corruption.
Judicial Autonomy
Apart from Costa Rica, no strong independent judiciary
exists in the region.

The strength of Costa Rica's judiciary is

largely due to three factors:

first, there is a historical

tradition of independence and popular support for such a notion;

secondly, supreme court judges are appointed to seven-year terms
and may be reappointed: and, thirdly, their budget is guaranteed
by the Constitution at 6% of the national budget.

In order to

maintain their independence, they have always formally requested
the full amount, even though they may later return some portion
to the national treasury.
While the constitutions of some other countries also provide

a mandatory fixed percentage for the judiciary, it is rarely
obtained in practice, Honduras, for example, provides for 3% of
the national budget to be allocated to the judiciary, but the
supreme court has never requested nor received the amount it is
entitled to by law.

Panama's judiciary has a 2% guarantee, under

the new 1984 Constitution, and did receive a substantial
budgetary increase--but not the allotted 2%.
Panama's new constitution also provided for ten-year terms
for supreme court judges, with staggered appointments to assure
continuity, an important step toward judicial independence.
There is clearly a recognition through the region of the need to
make judicial independence real.

Some important steps have been

taken, but a strong political will and a shared perception of the
fundamental importance of independent judiciaries to true
democracies are fragile commodities.
Procedure
The general design of a civil law system also provides
judges with some functions unknown in the common law countries,
Trials are divided into two phases:

an instructional stage and a

trial stage. The first involves all those actions which are
taken in preparation of the charges against the defendant, and is

carried out by an instructional magistrate, or a public
prosecutor.
Once a report of a crime is made, the instructional judge
assumes control over the investigation of the offense.

He

determines the nature of the crime, supervises the questioning of
witnesses, inspects the scene of the crime, appoints experts and
identifies suspects, The potential defendant is then called to
testify before this magistrate who takes a statement and enters
it into the record.

If an arrest is necessary, only this

magistrate is empowered to order it.

Once the suspect is in

custody, the magistrate determines whether to release this
defendant or to hold him in custody.

All matters reviewed during

this stage are set down in writing and placedina file, which
eventually embodies the case against the defendant.

Upon

completion of the investigatory stage, the instructional
magistrate will forward the complete file to the prosecutor for
review and thereupon the criminal action will be instituted on
the basis of a filing document.
While the foregoing generally describes the instructional
phase, each country in the region has assigned that function
differently,

The Dominican Republic has judges of instruction.

Honduras, Panama and Costa Rica do not, having either merged that
function with the trial judge or assigned it to the prosecutor.
But regardless of which functionary has the task, the near total
lack of investigatory resources and personnel makes effective
investigation extremely difficult and often impossible.

In most

instances, the national police, often a part of the military, are

the only investigative forces available.

The police may or may

not cooperate with the investigating judge.

In most instances,

very little professional investigative skill is available, and
the suspect's confession is the primary evidence.
In order to insure an objective trial, the evidence gathered
by the investigating magistrate is referred to the appropriate
trial court.

This material is admissible at the trial but may be

rebutted by the defendant.
Generally, the trial is not the public adversative
proceeding as known in the United States.

While in three of the

countries, limited oral hearings are provided during some trials,
at least for serious crimes, most trials are closed
administrative processes.

Honduras and El Salvador follow an

exclusively written system in which criminal cases become
"documentary contests--with each case being narrowed to sewn
volumes in which the court is totally isolated from the accused
and his background, and in which the judicial function is
delegated to employees and minor functionaries (if not in the
police)..."

(Zaffaroni, 1982: 79).

This feature, derived from

the old inquisitorial system, still predominates in these
countries.
Another feature common to these countries is the ability of
the judiciary to proceed against absent defendants, and for the

I

accused to be questioned before the judge without the presence of
his defense attorney.
Delay

amJ

Preventive Detention

Theneed for personal action o f t h e judge in so many
procedural stages, together with the paperwork required in this

system produces one of the most serious problems of Central
American justice:

delay in the processing of judicial matters.

The procedural delay, combined with a preference for
preventive detention, results in an inordinate percentage of the
jail population being held in prison prior to trial,

In a major

study of all Latin American and Caribbean nations for which
figures were available, Carranza, et al, found that the
percentage of inmates awaiting trial ranges from 2.18% in Cayman
to 94.25% in Paraguay, with a total average of 67.28% for the
eighteen countries studied (Carranza, et al, 1983).
The following features reveal the latest figures on the
amount of prisoners being detained prior to trial:
TABLE 1
Country

Year

Costa Rica

1981

Dominican Republic

1982

El Salvador

1981

Honduras

1981

Panama

1981

Source:

Total
Number of
Prisoners

Percentage
Not
Sentenced

Elias Carranza, Mario Houed, Luis Paulino Mora, Eugenio
Raul Zaffaroni (1983),
Preso sin Condena ey! Amgrica
y
Caribe. San Jose, Costa Rica: United
Nations: 22.

Generally the Latin American systems make excessive use of
preventive detention, and after trial, harsh sentences are the
norm with prison and fines being the two most prevalent forms of
punishment,

In some instances, the code presumes the

dangerousness of all detainees with prior criminal records,
disallowing any judicial review of circumstances (El Salvador).
In others, even if the codes allow such pretrial release, it is
seldom applied by the judiciary who seem to prefer routine denial
to pretrial review.
Prosecutors (Ministerio Public01
The Public Ministry is a civil law institution common to
all of the countries.
an institution.

The term describes a function rather than

Its main task is to assure compliance with all

laws as the prosecutorial branch of government.

As

such, its

duty is both to protect society from law violators as well as to
guarantee that the citizen is protected from governmental abuse.
The public ministry is exercised by law-trained persons
(usuallycalled a "fiscaln) who m a y b e a p a r t ofthe judicial or
executive branch, or both.

In the Dominican Republic, the

fiscales (prosecutors) are an arm of the executive,
administratively and politically dominant, and have more
effective control over the criminal process than the judges, who
operate almost exclusively without administrative staffs.
Honduras, the reverse appears to be true.

In

There, the public

ministry is exercised by two sets of fiscales, one within the
judicial, and one within the executive branch.

However, those

under the judicial branch have the only day-to-day role in the
criminal courts, and even this is much reduced.

The Honduran

judiciary's fiscal is basically a woefully underpaid
administrative assistant to the judge, Who shuffles paper and
rubber-stamps judicial decisions.

The fiscales attached to the

executive perform almost exclusively as the defenders of the
government in civil cases.
working part-time.

Many fiscales are law students,

Thus in Honduras, though the judiciary is

weak and inefficient, the judge still dominates criminal
proceedings and due to the debility of the public ministry there
appears to be less prosecutor-judicial conflict than in other
countries.
In Panama, another variant appears.

The public ministry's

prosecution function is actively exercised by fiscales assigned
to each court by the Procurator General.

This official is the

rough equivalent of the Attorney General of the U.S.

A unique

feature of Panama's system is the elimination (since 1941) of the
judge of instruction (investigating magistrate), and the
assignment of those investigating functions to the fiscales,
rather than merging the function with those duties of the first
level trial judge.

Thus, Panamanian fiscales exercise both the

investigative and prosecutorial functions, making them the
strongest in the region both legally and functionally.
the closest to the U.S.

This is

system where both activities are the

responsibility of the prosecuting attorney.
Costa Rica, as might be expected, incorporates the public
ministry under its uniquely dominant and well-financed judiciary.
However, even here there are problems of conflicting functions
and unclear lines of supervision.

There is no law describing and

limiting the functions of the Costa Rican public ministry or
fixing its position within the judicial branch hierarchy.

Costa

Rica has recognized this problem and is currently working on
reform proposals.

Generally, throughout the region the prosecutorial function
of the public ministry has been emphasized over its duty as
guarantor of individual legal rights.

Its resources are

seriously lacking for either function, particularly in the
Dominican Republic and Honduras, and it is unlikely that it will
prioritize the latter function when it cannot perform its
prosecutorial role adequately.
Public
Defenders
--- ------While this function exists in the region, it is virtually
undeveloped,

(Costa Rica is again the notable exception.)

A

1980 Honduras law providing for a free public defender system has
never been implemented, Panama has five public defenders for the
entire country.

They are underpaid and completely swamped with

gigantic caseloads.
In some instances, judges may and do appoint private lawyers
to defend indigents, but often the lawyer is diverted from the
task by his own private practice and neglects p r ~
bone cases.
Court dates are missed, and the accused remains in jail, Another
lawyer maybe appointed or the judgemay simply decide the case
on what is in the file, Though the codes of ethics of the bar
associations often impose an obligation to represent indigents,
this is not commonly enforced.
The only other source of legal assistance is programs within
the law faculties of some of the region's universities.

These

are of limited reach and concentrate mainly on civil and family
disputes rather than criminal cases, although some are now
beginning to focus toward student representation of criminal

d e f e n d a n t s under t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of a law f a c u l t y member o r o t h e r
member of t h e bar.
I t i s t h u s n o t uncommon f o r a d e f e n d a n t t o b e u n r e p r e s e n t e d

by c o u n s e l throughout t h e j u d i c i a l process.

The a b s o l u t e r i g h t

t o c o u n s e l h a s n o t been l e g a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h e region.

The

p u b l i c d e f e n d e r a r e a i s one o f extreme and o b v i o u s need.
Honduras, f o r example, h a s i d e n t i f i e d it a s a p r i o r i t y and asked
f o r f u n d s t o a c t i v a t e i t s 1980 l e g i s l a t i o n and o r g a n i z e a
f u n c t i o n i n g p u b l i c defender system.

The law f a c u l t y a t t h e

U n i v e r s i t y of Panama i s a l s o i n t e r e s t e d i n d e v e l o p i n g t h i s a r e a .
Bar A
---s-s-o c i a t i o n s
Bar a s s o c i a t i o n s ( C o l e g i o s d e abogados) h a v e been s l o w l y
e v o l v i n g i n t h e r e g i o n from s o c i a l groups p r o v i d i n g b e n e f i t s t o
members toward g r e a t e r p u b l i c i s s u e involvement.

I n some c a s e s ,

t h e r e have been r i v a l l a w y e r s groups, u s u a l l y h a v i n g a p a r t i c u l a r
p o l i t i c a l orientation.

The concept of a compulsory i n t e g r a t e d

b a r i s of r e c e n t o r i g i n i n most of t h e region.

It exists in

Costa Rica and Panama, and h a s been a c h i e v e d r e c e n t l y i n t h e
Dominican Republic.

Honduras h a s a s i n g l e a s s o c i a t i o n , b u t

membership i s n o t compulsory and i t s o n l y r e s o u r c e s a r e members'
dues.

E l S a l v a d o r h a s f i v e s e p a r a t e and h i g h l y p o l i t i c i z e d

associations.
While b a r a s s o c i a t i o n s h a v e n o t t r a d i t i o n a l l y p l a y e d a
s t r o n g r o l e i n support o f t h e j u d i c i a r y o r as p r e s s u r e groups f o r
law reform, t h a t i s changing i n p o s i t i v e ways.
The Dominican R e p u b l i c i s a c a s e i n p o i n t .

I n t h e two y e a r s

s i n c e passage o f t h e law making membership i n a n a t i o n a l
i n t e g r a t e d b a r mandatory, t h e r e s u l t a n t e n t i t y h a s e v o l v e d

rapidly into a significant pressure group and is actively backing
President Salvador Jorge Blancols efforts to enact a judicial
civil service system.

As part of the effort, the Dominican

association has recently sponsored a National Congress on the
Judiciary, which produced a detailed set of recommendations for
achieving and assuring judicial independence. The Dominican bar
has been a significant force in a recent nationwide judges1
strike for higher pay and passage of the pending judicial career
law.
While less focused in their goals than the Dominicans, the
Panamanian bar is now publicly demanding judicial reform.

In

Honduras, the bar association as yet is neither very active nor
very strong.

The Costa Rican bar association is the strongest in

the region, but there, most of the basic reforms needed elsewhere
have already been achieved.
Indhenous
Reform -----Efforts
---- ---Central American judiciaries have been cognizant of many of
the deficiencies demonstrated by their systems and have initiated
reform efforts to correct them.

Honduras has just enacted a

major revision of its criminal code as a result of
recommendations by a law reform commission.

El Salvador has

created two commissions to review legal codes and make
recommendations on the administration of justice.

The Dominican

Republic established a review team which has suggested major
reforms in the administrative structure of the judicial system.
Finally, Costa Rica has continually reviewed its system of
justice and maintains an on-going commission composed of

principal actors from the legal community.
Pa& U.S. &,l Assistance Efforts in Developing Countries
T ~ a wand Development1
Assistance to Third World nations1 legal systems is not a
new concept and was once at the core of development ventures.
Past efforts were embodied in the "law and development" program
in Latin America.
American legal assistance to developing countries began
immediately after World War Two and reached its zenith during the
late 1960's.

All of these efforts flowed from notions of the

superiority of the American legal model as the means of reaching
a democratic solution to development in the emerging nations
(Gardner, 1980).

The approach became operational in Latin

America in the mid-1960's with the introduction of legal
education reform projects in Costa Rica, Brazil, Chile, Colombia
,

and Peru, under the auspices of the United States Agency for
International Development and several American law professors.
In Latin America, the U.S.

law and development movement

encountered an entrenched legal culture, peopled by a large and
I

powerful legal profession, trained in formalism and bound to
European and national institutions.
The major obstacle to the American model was the nature of
Latin American legal education.

Law instruction in Latin America

dates back to 1553, centuries before American law schools
appeared on the scene.

Latin American law schools introduce law

through a lecture system, during a five year period, immediately
upon graduation from secondary studies.

Their approach to law is

comprehensive, placing emphasis on philosophy and history rather

than the practical aspects of the profession, in sharp contrast
to American legal education.

American legal scholars, working in

the law and development effort, attempted to shift the emphasis
from this lecture method to Socratic principles and case studies,
so prevalent in American law schools, with very little success.
By the beginning of the 70's the optimistic projections of the
innovators were reevaluated, and they tended to move away from
basic reform of legal education to practical applications aimed
at utilizing existing structures.

In Costa Rica, for example, a

comprehensive indexing system for existing legislative materials
was introduced (Wroe, 1973).
Although it is difficult to summarize the basic flaws in the
American development effort in a few words, the following may be
pointed out:
1. Most, if not all of these effortswere conceived and

planned in the United States, and not in the receiving countries.
As such, many of these efforts were ethnocentric, developed by
I

American lawyers who combined an almost religious belief in the
certainty and transportability of the American legal model with
only limited information and experience of the receiving
countries.
2. Most projects were overly ambitious in their expectation

I

that changes in the legal systems would translate into instant
democratic models.
3. Perhaps the most basic flaw of these programs is that

they sought to change institutions and principles which were at
the cultural core of the societies which they were seeking to

19

alter,
4. The programs were often based on erroneous information,

primarily resulting from the lack of empirical data available on
the operation of the legal system.
5, They mistook the willingness of Latin Americans to

receive funding for a willingness to accept the principles being
exported.

